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Nomology, Ontology, and Phenomenology of Law
and Technology
Kieran Tranter*
INTRODUCTION
Bruno Latour has suggested that the defining feature of
modernity has been the creation of monsters. While modernity
has been erected on the division of the world into disciplines, a
consequence of this neat structure has been the birthing of
dilemmas—hybrids—that are not reducible to one order of
knowledge. 1 One manifestation of this observation is the
hybridization of thought through the crossing of disciplinary
boundaries.
This Article presents such a hybrid, combining the
insights of legal theory and technology studies. It argues that
phenomenological approaches to the study of law and
technology offer ways of understanding the relations between
law and technology that avoids the reduction of law to
technology that characterizes most current scholarship. The
starting point is the observation that legal scholarship on
technology articulates a theory of law and technology by
conceiving law as a form of technical apparatus. In this it
© 2007 Kieran Tranter.
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1. BRUNO LATOUR, WE HAVE NEVER BEEN MODERN 6 (Catherine Porter
trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1993).
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invokes the nomology of sovereignty.
By nomology of
sovereignty what is meant is the understanding of law as a
field of knowledge about rules and the manipulation of rules
for any purpose by the sovereign. Exposing the nomology of
sovereignty leads to more essential critiques of technology, as
the technical character of the law suggests the ontological
concern with the forgetting of Being first raised by Martin
Heidegger. Heidegger regarded modern technically mediated
existence as highly negative. He located the origins of this
negative modernity within the Western philosophic tradition.
In response he argued the necessity for Western thought to
return to its absolute origins in pre-Socratic Greek thinking as
the study of ontology; that is the fundamental structure of the
world and the relation of fundamental structure to human
existence. In so doing, Heidegger claimed to have removed the
conceptual distractions and obstacles from thinking about
essential existence, or in his preferred term Being, and thereby
opening a way to move beyond modern technical existence.
Heidegger’s way through what he sees as the debris of
Western philosophy has been taken by subsequent theorists in
several directions. One direction remains within Heidegger’s
metaphysics and tragically talks of absolute inescapable
technology, the other returns to being-in the world in
phenomenology.
It is suggested that phenomenological
approaches, approaches that begin with an appreciation of the
world as is and by embracing the world’s messy complexities,
provide a rich vein for the development of law and technology
studies.
Section I takes up the theme of monsters. It argues that
the story of Frankenstein’s monster manifests twice over
within law and technology scholarship. In describing an
abomination of technology and humanity, this literature
frequently presents law as the savior. This is ironic because
law turns out to be a monster in disguise; it is neither good nor
evil, but pure power, which provided it is controlled by the
lawyer/technocratic can benefit a passive society. Section II
locates law and technology’s technical law within the nomology
of sovereignty. Through Weber, Schmitt, Benjamin, and
Agamben, it is suggested that the violence intimate to the
nomology of sovereignty has its origins in Heidegger’s claim
concerning the forgetting of Being in the West. Section III
reexamines Heidegger’s theory on the relations of technology
and Being and considers its theoretical and methodological
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outcomes. Section IV argues that phenomenology provides
alternative methods through which to think about law and
technology. In particular it argues that an approach to
studying law and technology through detailed and rich
historical examinations, or alternatively approaches focusing
on the speculative narratives embedded in law and technology
and utilizing science fiction to think through this speculative
jurisdiction, provide alternative frames through which to
further study law and technology.
I. FRANKENSTEIN AS MODERN MYTH
This section argues that legal writing about technology is
ironically structured on the modern myth of Frankenstein.
This argument begins by examining literary concern with
Frankenstein as mythic and indeed as a modern myth. It then
considers how this myth manifests twice over within law and
technology scholarship. First, as narrative characterizing
technology as a dangerous monster needed the control and
order of law. Second, and ironically, the character of this
controlling law is also monstrous.
The formal elements of Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein are
well known; scientist creates monster, scientist spurs monster,
monster learns about humanity and its own monstrousness,
monster becomes pathological, climaxing with monster killing
scientist. 2 Indeed, critics referring to this familiarity have
argued that Frankenstein is mythic rather then textual, 3
suggesting a residual dilemma that surrounds the novel. 4
Formally, myths are associated with the oral, pre-modern and
pre-rational, and to talk about them in the context of a
written, modern artifact like a novel is problematic: “Since
modernity is opposed to myth, denying the relevance of myth
to itself, there is an initial problem of how coherently to
represent these accounts of myth in modern terms.” 5
Frankenstein, as cultural scholars have identified in their
cataloguing of its archive, 6 exceeds Shelley’s text. Indeed, it is
2. MARY SHELLEY, FRANKENSTEIN OR THE MODERN PROMETHEUS (A
Signet Classic 1965) (1818).
3. See, e.g., CHRIS BALDICK, IN FRANKENSTEIN’S SHADOW: MYTH,
MONSTROSITY AND NINETEENTH-CENTURY WRITING 1–9 (1987); JON TURNEY,
FRANKENSTEIN’S FOOTSTEPS: SCIENCE, GENETICS, AND POPULAR CULTURE 4
(1998).
4. TURNEY, supra note 3, at 26–28.
5. PETER FITZPATRICK, THE MYTHOLOGY OF MODERN LAW 14 (1992).
6. STEVEN EARL FORRY, HIDEOUS PROGENIES: DRAMATIZATIONS OF
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this excess within popular culture that allows Frankenstein to
be regarded as a myth manifesting differently in different
articulations while possessing a stable symbolic content. 7
Baldick also argues that Frankenstein is not just a
modern myth but a myth of modernity. 8 As numerous scholars
have noted, 9 the Frankenstein myth concerns the
quintessential modern relationship between humans and
technology. It provides what amounts to a series of interlinked
characterizations and associations concerning scientists,
technology, and human society. Victor Frankenstein, the
protagonist, becomes the epitome of the rational scientist too
preoccupied with his techniques to consider the wider context
of his illicit creation. 10 As a metaphor for technology, the
monster is ambiguous: it has the potential for good 11 (e.g.,
rescuing a child, appreciating classical literature and history
such as Goethe, Plutarch, and Milton) and the potential for
evil (e.g. murdering Elizabeth, Victor Frankenstein’s bride, on
their wedding night). 12 It is at once a thing to be pitied and a
thing to be feared, and in most commentaries, Victor, with his
ego and petty revulsion, is revealed as the true monster. 13 The
monster’s “thing-ness,” its status as external to humanity, is

FRANKENSTEIN FROM MARY SHELLEY TO THE PRESENT (1990); DONALD F.
GLUT, THE FRANKENSTEIN ARCHIVE: ESSAYS ON THE MONSTER, THE MYTH,
THE MOVIES AND MORE (2002).
See generally DONALD F. GLUT, THE
FRANKENSTEIN CATALOG (1984) (compiling a variety of works derived from
the story of Frankenstein, including novels, translations, adaptations, series,
stage plays, films, and musical recordings).
7. See WALTER ONG, ORALITY AND LITERACY: THE TECHNOLOGIZING OF
THE WORD 12 (1982) (“The elements out of which a term is originally built
usually, and probably always, linger somehow in subsequent meanings,
perhaps obscurely but often powerfully and even irreducibly.”).
8. BALDICK, supra note 3, at 5.
9. See BRIAN ALDISS & DAVID WINGROVE, TRILLION YEAR SPREE: THE
HISTORY OF SCIENCE FICTION 51 (1986); THE ENDURANCE OF FRANKENSTEIN:
ESSAYS ON MARY SHELLEY’S NOVEL 3, 16–17 (George Levine ed., 1979). See
generally FRED BOTTING, MAKING MONSTROUS: FRANKENSTEIN, CRITICISM,
THEORY 164–84 (1991).
10. LANGDON WINNER, AUTONOMOUS TECHNOLOGY: TECHNICS-OUT-OFCONTROL AS A THEME IN POLITICAL THOUGHT 313 (1977).
11. Robert Olorenshaw, Narrating the Monster: From Mary Shelley to
Bram Stoker, in FRANKENSTEIN, CREATION AND MONSTROSITY 165 (Stephen
Bann ed., 1994).
12. See TURNEY, supra note 3, at 38–39.
13. See, e.g., ANDREW MILNER, LITERATURE, CULTURE, AND SOCIETY 155
(1996) (describing Frankenstein’s “bad faith” in reneging on his promise to
build a companion for his creation).
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repeatedly emphasized through its exclusion from human
society and its desire for a mate of its own kind. In this the
monster
animates
an
amoral
and
non-human
conceptualization of technology. Frankenstein also shows the
vulnerability of human society to the revolutionary, and often
bloody, product of science. The scientist concocts in his private
rooms, while society remains passive and impotent against the
depravity of his monstrous creation. Absent from the myth is
any institutional counterforce; there is no Inquisition or Royal
Society to control the scientist and creation.
It is at this point that a specific legal articulation of the
Frankenstein myth introduces a possible solution. Much law
and technology scholarship articulates elements of the
Frankenstein myth. It presents scientists as knowledge
seekers blind to the wider contexts, and technologies as
monsters possessing the potential for good and evil while
society lies vulnerable. Glenn Reynolds exemplifies this
tendency in a recent article about nanotechnology. He notes
that society has yet to consider the wider dimensions of this
research 14 and he canvasses its potential benefits and
harms. 15 The legal supplement to the Frankenstein myth
emerges in Reynolds’ articulation of this social element.
Reynolds devotes the bulk of his paper to assessing legal
responses to nanotechnology. 16 Faced with the possibility for
good or evil from this technology, Reynolds’ has society turning
to law for regulation. Faced with the possibility for good or
evil, society turns to law for regulation. 17 Thus Reynolds
follows a historical pattern of invoking law to regulate
monsters. 18 The question becomes one of selecting the right
instruments. For Reynolds, this involves rejecting outright
prohibition or exceptions for military purposes and affirming a
compound approach of guidelines and licensing. 19 In the legal
Frankenstein story, society might be vulnerable to
technological change, but it is not passive. Law will restrain
the monster’s urges and harness them for the greater good;

14. Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Nanotechnology and Regulatory Policy:
Three Futures, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 179, 180–81 (2003).
15. Id. at 185–187.
16. See id. at 187–209.
17. Id. at 187.
18. Martin Jay, Must Justice Be Blind? The Challenge of Images to the
Law, in LAW AND THE IMAGE: THE AUTHORITY OF ART AND THE AESTHETICS
OF LAW 19 (Costas Douzinas & Lynda Nead eds., 1999).
19. Reynolds, supra note 14, at 188–209.

TRANTER K. Nomology, Ontology, and Phenomenology of Law and Technology. MINN. J.L. SCI.
& TECH. 2007;8(2):449-474.

454

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 8:2

provided “the political system will approach these questions
with wisdom, rather than arrogance.” 20
An irony intrudes at this point. The legal articulation of
the Frankenstein myth champions the law as a technical
discourse. 21 The assessment of law becomes a comparison of
techniques, logically explored through analogy and evidence.
Reynolds assesses the policy alternatives by examining the
costs and benefits of prohibition, 22 and comparing
nanotechnology to the military restriction of nuclear
technology 23 and regulation in the biotechnology regime. 24
Arthur Cockfield has hinted that often in the context of law
and technology “law is technology.” 25 The irony lies in how the
invocation of law to save society might reinscribe the
Frankenstein myth, with the lawyer cast as the technician and
law playing the role of the monster. What is being suggested
is that the Frankenstein myth functions within discourses on
law and technology. That it is not just a collection of images of
technology out of control or of the immorality of science, but
replicates itself within the arguments by lawyers concerning
legal responses to technology. Law is seen as power which can
be used for good, or more precisely to achieve good within
society. However, this good is not intrinsic to law. Like the
monster law is beyond good and evil, a pure power, and it is
only when subject to the will of the lawyer/technician can its
power be harnessed for good. The irony is in invoking law to
save society from the possible depredations of monstrous
technology what is unleashed is another monster, the “tame”
monster of law.
There are two immediate responses to this observation.
The first is that it is theoretically interesting but superfluous
to the pragmatics of public policy. Intellectual sustenance for
this approach can be found in Søren Kierkegaard, who
considers that irony “limits, finitizes, and circumscribes” and
in doing so actually grounds a practical and engaged living. 26
20. Id. at 209.
21. See Annelise Riles, A New Agenda for the Cultural Study of Law:
Taking on the Technicalities, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 973, 975–76 (2005).
22. Reynolds, supra note 14, at 188–92.
23. Id. at 193–207.
24. Id. at 197–200.
25. Arthur J. Cockfield, Towards a Law and Technology Theory, 30 MAN.
L.J. 382, 402 (2005).
26. SOREN KIERKEGAARD, THE CONCEPT OF IRONY WITH CONTINUAL

TRANTER K. Nomology, Ontology, and Phenomenology of Law and Technology. MINN. J.L. SCI.
& TECH. 2007;8(2):449-474.

2007] NOMOLOGY, ONTOLOGY & PHENOMENOLOGY

455

The second response is that the proposition that law is a
fantastic technological terror is an extreme example of
totalizing categorization obliterating questions of degree. In
short, if law is technology, then it is a beast that has long been
domesticated, and like the motor vehicle, it is familiar. This
ignores a salient truth: just because the motor vehicle is
familiar does not excuse it from being the eleventh worldwide
killer in 2002. 27 Similarly, the fact that techniques of law,
(e.g. of the merits and substance of various forms of regulation,
of the effect of criminal sanctions and prohibitions, when
guidelines are more appropriate then statutory codes, the
utility of administrators with wide discretionary powers as
opposed to narrowly prescribed duties and obligations, of the
cost and benefits of letting the courts develop law on a case to
case basis) are familiar does not mean that the implications of
law as technology are not significant for thinking about a
theory of law and technology. Indeed, monstrous violence and
death reappear when considering the theoretical implications
of this recognition.
II. NOMOLOGY OF SOVEREIGNTY
The previous section, by identifying the function of the
Frankenstein myth, showed that the relevant scholarship
disclosed a theory of law and technology in subsuming law to
technology. This section considers this within the context of
legal theory. It is argued that in doing this, what is disclosed is
the nomology of sovereignty, which at its most pure, or most
extreme, threatens human life. This conclusion is reached
through recognition of the nomology of sovereignty behind the
technical discussions of law and technology about how to do
things with rules.
It considers how the nomology of
sovereignty can be part explained, as Weber did, as the
rationalization of the legal system. However, in emphasizing
rationality the essential irrationality has been underemphasized. Through experience of, involvement with, and
reflection on, the transformation of the Weimar Republic to
Nazi Germany, writers such as Schmitt, Benjamin and
Agamben expose the fundamental violence of sovereignty and
its ultimate transformation of humans into animals.
The articulation of the Frankenstein myth in law and
REFERENCE TO SOCRATES 326 (Howard V. Hong & Edna H. Hong eds., 1989).
27. WORLD REPORT ON ROAD TRAFFIC INJURY PREVENTION 4 (Margie
Peden et al. eds., 2004).
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technology scholarship means that legal thinking about
technology embodies a particular nomology. This unifies the
ostensibly diverse strands of law and technology scholarship.
Legal scholarship on technology concerns the effectiveness of
rules. The analysis proceeds by way of statements concerning
how rules work, often drawing upon a priori thinking about
rules mixed with case studies through which psychological,
sociological, and economic assumptions concerning actors’
responses to particular forms of regulation are examined.
Regardless of whether the authors ultimately select standards,
licensing, self-regulation, economic incentives, criminalization,
regulation, or the common law, there is a shared nomology of
law that serves as a tool for public policy. This nomology is not
unique to law and technology, but rather, as W. T. Murphy has
observed, it is the bedrock of modern legal thinking:
Law today is . . . constrained to produce knowledge at secondhand:
knowledge of the rules which govern – or fail to govern, as the case
may be – the world as it is ‘really’ known to be – by psychologists,
economists, accountants and others. Knowledge and power, at one
level, are no less linked than they were before. But now the link
must be specified in terms of the production of performance
indicators and the diagnosis of social problems . . . . 28

However, to consider the theoretical implications of law as
technology another story needs to be told.
The English common law was an oral law, indeed a mythic
Located in time immemorial, it claimed that it
law. 29
emanated from the very soil of the “Sceptred Isle.” 30 The
judicial function was to declare the law, not make it, and legal
training amounted to memorizing speeches and decisions of
the past. 31 Written records, where they existed, were cryptic
mnemonic aids for those initiated in their craft of “artificial
Nonetheless, as with the wider Reformation,
reason.” 32
England experienced legal reformation in the expansion of the

28. W. T. Murphy, The Oldest Social Science? The Epistemic Properties of
the Common Law Tradition, 54 MOD. L. REV. 182, 213–14 (1991).
29. See COSTAS DOUZINA ET AL., POSTMODERN JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW
OF TEXT IN THE TEXTS OF LAW 153 (1991).
30. See, e.g., PETER GOODRICH, LANGUAGES OF LAW: FROM LOGICS OF
MEMORY TO NOMADIC MASKS 210–13 (1990); see also GERALD J. POSTEMA,
BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 4–5 (1986).
31. See generally PETER GOODRICH, LAW IN THE COURTS OF LOVE 86–90
(1996) (discussing oral legal traditions).
32. Id. at 108.
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influence of the Crown and Parliament. 33 Politically, the
common law negotiated this period by aligning with the Crown
and nationalizing its jurisdiction as the King’s Court. 34 It also
developed the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy,
reinventing itself as a body of inferior rules. 35 This preserved
much of the common law, both in practice and doctrine, until
the reforms of the nineteenth century. 36
Such a story is familiar. Indeed, the narrative of the
Reformation birthing a spirit of rational activity that
refashions the pre-modern into the modern has its origins in
Max Weber’s rationalization thesis, which linked protestant
asceticism to the formation of capitalism and also to the
machine-culture of modern life. 37 For Weber, the evolution of
modern law was a movement from oral legal orders, to
systemic codification, to the provision of procedural
Weber, however,
frameworks for rational bureaucracy. 38
underplayed a critical creature that emerged during this
development—the sovereign. Familiarity dims awareness of
how radical Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan was within Western
political and legal thought. 39 Hobbes declared a particular act,
the social contract, as the origin of political and legal
authority. 40 Unlike the common law and other pre-modern
orders where continuity was assured through transcendence,
the emergence of the sovereign meant that questions of
authority became temporal. 41 Law was no longer law because
of custom or nature, but rather because of a valid lawmaking
act of the sovereign. The modern history of jurisprudence can
be read as an attempt to relate the sovereign’s plastic law to

33. W. T. MURPHY, THE OLDEST SOCIAL SCIENCE?: CONFIGURATIONS OF
LAW AND MODERNITY 72–74 (1997).
34. See generally PETER GOODRICH, OEDIPUS LEX: PSCHOANALYSIS,
HISTORY, LAW 70 (1995) (describing the adoption of the common law in
medieval England).
35. POSTEMA, supra note 30, at 102–03.
36. See H. L. A. HART, ESSAYS ON BENTHAM: STUDIES IN JURISPRUDENCE
AND POLITICAL THEORY 29–34 (1982).
37. MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM
180–182 (Talcott Parsons trans. 1992).
38. Maureen Cain, The Limits of Idealism: Max Weber and the Sociology
of Law, 3 RES. L. & SOC. 53, 70 (1980).
39. DAVID SAUNDERS, ANTI-LAWYERS: RELIGION AND THE CRITICS OF
LAW AND STATE 4–6 (1997).
40. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 90 (A.D. Lindsay & K.R. Minogue
eds.,1914).
41. POSTEMA, supra note 30, at 48.
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questions of identification, obedience, and limit. 42 With the
sovereign, creation is not located in a mythic time but merges
with lived time to be an ever present possibility. Jacques
Derrida termed this critical element of modernity “white
mythology.” 43 The phrase plays on ambiguities. 44 First,
“white” is used in two ways; it is a white mythology because it
belongs to the West; and it is white because it is a colorless
myth. In merging mythic and lived time, the color and poetry
of the creation stories of pre-modernity are lost. Gesturing
towards Weber, creation becomes a bland task of the
sovereign’s officers writing on white paper. Second, to talk of a
mythology of modernity is to deny modernity’s own claims to
have dispensed with the irrational.
It is the revelation of the irrational at the core of
sovereignty that has been missed by much twentieth century
legal thought. Hans Kelsen proposed a legal order rationally
unfolding from a shared grundnorm; that the legal order is
legitimized by a fundamental “political” acceptance of its
Ronald Dworkin proposed a theory of
legitimacy. 45
adjudication as a Herculean, yet rational activity. 46 Indeed,
liberal political thought has tried to deny the irrationality of
sovereignty; having birthed Leviathan, theory has put it in the
chains of constitutions, rights, separation of powers, and due
process. 47 It took the chaos of the Weimar Republic, and the
perception that rational application of liberal values could not
form a nation capable of defending itself from its internal and
external enemies that led the Weimar jurist Carl Schmitt to
reaffirm the irrationality of sovereignty. 48 Schmitt defined the
sovereign as the entity that could declare an exception:
suspending or abolishing the existing order, and deciding on
whatever measures are required to address the exception. 49
42. COSTAS DOUZINAS, THE END OF HUMAN RIGHTS: CRITICAL LEGAL
THOUGHT AT THE TURN OF THE CENTURY 110–112 (2000).
43. JACQUES DERRIDA, MARGINS OF PHILOSOPHY 213 (Alan Bass trans.,
1982).
44. FITZPATRICK, supra note 5, at 32.
45. HANS KELSEN, INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF LEGAL THEORY
56–57 (Bonnie Litschewski Paulson & Stanley L. Paulson trans., 1992).
46. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 105–123 (1977).
47. STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINT: ON THE THEORY OF
LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 69–70 (1995).
48. CARL SCHMITT, THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL 32 (George Schwab
trans. 1996).
49. CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE
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Schmitt was one of the first legal theorists to recognize that
law in modernity is another technology. 50 He perceived
positive law of liberal legislatures as mere naked power
transmuted into whatever ends are regarded as appropriate. 51
He was similarly critical of liberalism because it could not
distinguish between values—between ends that will defend
and sustain the nation, and ends that give the nation over to
its enemies. In this inability to distinguish values, modern
law and liberalism both manifest the “economical-technical
apparatus” which is indifferent between “a silk blouse and
poison gas.” 52
For Schmitt, the hubris of liberalism, its inability to
distinguish between values and ultimately between friends
and enemies of the nation, creates the nemesis of sovereign
authoritarianism. However, Schmitt’s polemics of sovereigns
and enemies was also “white.” He is not concerned with the
personal costs of the rationality/irrationality of sovereignty.
Schmitt’s context as a conservative jurist who advances within
the academy and goes on to holds official appointments within
the Nazi government 53 should remind of the violence and
horrors of that regime. Nevertheless, it has only been recently
that violence has been appreciated within legal theory. The
vehicle for this has been the reception of another Weimar
intellectual, in correspondence with Schmitt, 54 but from a
radically different political and religious tradition—Walter
Benjamin. Through an extended examination of Benjamin’s
“Critique of Violence,” Derrida has reminded jurisprudence
that legal order is founded on two violences: the violence that
founds and the violence that preserves the law. 55 Both become
indistinguishable in the modern apparatus of the police state.

CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY 5 (George Schwab trans. 1985); see also CARL
SCHMITT, LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY 69 (Jeffery Seitzer trans., 2004).
50. JOHN P. MCCORMICK, CARL SCHMITT’S CRITIQUE OF LIBERALISM:
AGAINST POLITICS AS TECHNOLOGY 31–82 (1997).
51. Carl Schmitt, The Age of Neutralizations and Depoliticizations (1929),
96 TELOS 130 (1993).
52. CARL SCHMITT, THE IDEA OF REPRESENTATION: A DISCUSSION 39
(E.M. Codd trans., 1988).
53. See JAN-WERNER MÜLLER, A Dangerous Mind: Carl Schmitt In
Post-War European Thought (2003).
54. Samuel Weber, Taking Exception to Decision: Walter Benjamin and
Carl Schmitt, 22 DIACRITICS 5 (1992).
55. Jacques Derrida, Force of Law: The “Mystical Foundations of
Authority”, in DECONSTRUCTION AND THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE 3, 35–40
(Drucilla Cornell et al. eds., 1992).

TRANTER K. Nomology, Ontology, and Phenomenology of Law and Technology. MINN. J.L. SCI.
& TECH. 2007;8(2):449-474.

460

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 8:2

The shared commonality is a species of “mythic violence,” as
opposed to “divine violence” and the defining characteristic is
the need for blood: 56 “Mythical violence is bloody power over
mere life for its own sake, divine violence pure power over all
life for the sake of the living. The first demands sacrifice, the
second accepts it. 57 It is tempting to locate Benjamin’s essay
within his life, and consider, in his suicide on the Spanish
border in 1940 while fleeing occupied France, that the text was
a response to the Nazi state. However, “Critique of Violence,”
dated 1921, anticipated rather then “witnessed” the bloody
machinations of Nazism. 58 Giorgio Agamben, drawing upon
Schmitt and Benjamin, does attempt to construct a juridical
account of Nazism’s signature excess: the concentration camp.
For Agamben, the camp is not to be understood as just an evil,
the tragic production of madmen, but rather it’s a
manifestation of the “perfection” of the nomology of
sovereignty in the West. 59 The camp makes explicit that the
ultimate fact of sovereignty is violent power over bare life, the
very physical bodies of subjects. 60
So the nomology of law and technology scholarship reveals
three elements.
The first is that law is considered
technological, a discourse about techniques and effectiveness.
The second is that this rational project is grounded on the
terrible irrationality of sovereign violence.
Sovereignty
allowed law to become historical and instrumental; it
facilitated a changeable law that in essence is not subject to a
meta-law. 61 Indeed, it is sensible to talk of a non-nomology of
sovereignty. 62 The place where the extent of this law of a
sovereign that knows no boundaries is registered is the human
body. The third is this sacrilege of the human. In this camp,
Agamben forcefully reminds that the human becomes just an
56. Id. at 42–45, 52.
57. WALTER BENJAMIN, Critique of Violence, in REFLECTIONS: ESSAYS,
APHORISMS, AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL WRITINGS 277, 297 (Edmund Jephcott
trans., 1978).
58. Derrida, supra note 55, at 57.
59. GIORGIO AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER: SOVEREIGN POWER AND BARE LIFE
166–174 (1998).
60. Id. at 175.
61. William P. MacNeil, One Recht to Rule Them All! Law’s Empire in the
Age of Empire, in AESTHETICS IN LAW AND CULTURE: TEXT, IMAGES, SCREENS
279 (Andrew T. Kenyon & Peter D. Rush eds., 2004).
62. Philippe Nonet, What is Positive Law?, 100 YALE L.J. 667, 679–680
(1990).
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animal: a material substance to be used and consumed. 63 A
symptom of this is rights discourse where the subject before
the law is atomized into a collective of abstract postulates that
do not relate to, nor preserve, biological life. 64 Absent from
this tripartite of nomology, sovereignty, and animal is a
perception of what it might mean to be an entity that can
appreciate itself as an entity, and can appreciate itself thrown
into a world possessing this temporal structure. This suggests
the third Weimar intellectual invoked by Derrida—Heidegger
and his concern with a return to ontology as the task of
philosophy. 65
III. ONTOLOGY OF TECHNOLOGY
This section approaches law and technology from
technological theory: specifically through remembering
Heidegger’s account of the essence of technology. Heidegger is
significant because, unlike legal theory where attempts to
secure humanity from nomology-sovereignty-animal often end
in rhetorical calls that knowing the “machine” of West will
lead to its interruption, 66 or with variations on Benjamin’s
divine violence, 67 technology studies drawn from Heidegger
demonstrate ways of living with technology.
Heidegger has had a minimal impact on legal theory. 68
His influence has been limited to studies that have attempted
to make connections between Continental hermeneutics and
the Anglo-American legal tradition. 69 It seems surprising that
anxieties concerning the denigration of law into technology
have not drawn upon Heidegger. This absence is possibly
explained by the on-going controversy regarding Heidegger’s
involvement with the Nazis and the suggestion that his Nazi
involvement can be grounded in his thought. 70 This is
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

AGAMBEN, supra note 59, at 187.
DOUZINAS, supra note 42, at 322.
Derrida, supra note 55, at 46.
GIORGIO AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION 87–88 (2005).
COSTAS DOUZINAS & RONNIE WARRINGTON, JUSTICE MISCARRIED:
ETHICS, AESTHETICS AND THE LAW (1994).
68. Panu Minkkinen, Right Things: On the Question of Being and Law, 7
LAW & CRITIQUE 65, 66 (1996).
69. Ingrid Scheibler, Gadamer, Heidegger and the Social Dimensions of
Language: Reflections on the Critical Potential of Hermeneutical Philosophy
76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 853, 856–69 (2000); Brian Leiter, Heidegger and the
Theory of Adjudication, 106 YALE L.J. 253, 253–54 (1996).
70. Matthias Mahlmann, Heidegger’s Political Philosophy and the Theory
of the Liberal State, 14 LAW AND CRITIQUE 229, 240–244 (2003).
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unfortunate. Where legal theory presented a juridical-political
account of law as technology, Heidegger exposes the
ontological commitments that manifest within that account.
In doing so, he opens fresh ways to think about law and
technology. What follows is an exposition of Heidegger’s
relationship between technology and his fundamental concern
with the forgetting of Being in the West. What is suggested is
that this metaphysical account has been highly influential
within technology studies and has lead to two styles of
scholarship. The first remains metaphysical and regards
technology as polluting and degrading human existence. The
second, grounded on being-in the world opens to
phenomenology.
Heidegger’s writings on technology need to be considered
from within his wider concerns with the impoverishment of
ontology, and the need for a revitalized ontology to structure
critical questions about modern existence. 71 For Heidegger,
the Western metaphysical tradition had forgotten the question
of Being. 72 That is, the ontological task of thinking about
being an entity disclosed to its own existence 73 had been
passed over in favor of “pragmatic” abstractions. 74 Technology
was important to Heidegger, not because of its monstrous
violence, but because in its holding sway the forgetting of
Being is absolute. 75 Therefore, Heidegger’s grappling with
technology belongs within a project to find a “restorative
surmounting of the essence of technology.” 76 For Heidegger,
technology does not just amount to machines, but is a
fundamental way of revealing the world as is:
The revealing that rules throughout modern technology has the
character of a setting-upon, in the sense of a challenging-forth. That
challenging happens in that the energy concealed in nature is
unlocked, what is unlocked is transformed, what is transformed is

71. ANDREW FEENBERG, HEIDEGGER AND MARCUSE: THE CATASTROPHE
REDEMPTION OF HISTORY 25 (2005).
72. MARTIN HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME 1 (Joan Stambaugh trans.,
1996).
73. Id. at 10–11, 40–42.
74. MICHAEL E. ZIMMERMAN, HEIDEGGER’S CONFRONTATION WITH
MODERNITY: TECHNOLOGY, POLITICS, AND ART 152 (1990).
75. MARTIN HEIDEGGER, The Age of the World Picture, in THE QUESTION
CONCERNING TECHNOLOGY AND OTHER ESSAYS 115, 116 (William Lovitt
trans., 1977).
76. MARTIN HEIDEGGER, The Turning, in THE QUESTION CONCERNING
TECHNOLOGY AND OTHER ESSAYS 36, 39 (William Lovitt trans., 1977).
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stored up, what is stored up is, in turn, distributed, and what is
distributed is switched about ever anew. 77

This leads Heidegger to name the essence of technology
Enframing: 78
Enframing means the gathering together of that setting-upon which
sets upon man, i.e., challenges him forth, to revel the real, in the
mode of ordering, as standing-reserve. Enframing means that way of
revealing which holds sway in the essence of modern technology and
which is nothing technological. 79

This quote suggests three elements concerning the essence
of technology. The first is that technology “revel[s] the real:”
that is it occupies the very essence of humanity.
For
Heidegger, to be human means to be “thrown” into the world,
and our fate is to come to a dwelling in this finite totality.” 80
Second, humans in their “thrown-ness” are gifted with the
responsibility towards truth; “man is given to belong to the
coming-to-pass of truth.” 81 Heidegger’s use of truth is not to
invoke correspondence, 82 but a pre-Socratic notion of “truth”
(alētheia) concerned with how the world is revealed. The
destiny of humanity is in bringing forth what is undisclosed. 83
Third, Heidegger’s understanding of technology as a way of
revealing, allowed him to situate technology within Being.
“Technology is a mode of revealing. Technology comes to
presence in the realm where revealing and un-concealment
take place, where alētheia, truth, happens.” 84
Having located technology within Being, Heidegger sets
out the ontological commitments of such a Being. Enframing
involves “setting upon.” Rather then letting beings reveal
themselves to humanity, humanity imposes a technological
“truth” onto entities. 85 This truth is a “standing-reserve” in a
stockpile, ready-at-hand to be deployed. 86 The fate of the
world
is
it
becomes
atomized,
abstracted,
and

77. MARTIN HEIDEGGER, The Question Concerning Technology, in THE
QUESTION CONCERNING TECHNOLOGY AND OTHER ESSAYS 3, 16 (William
Lovitt trans., 1977).
78. Id. at 19.
79. Id. at 20.
80. HEIDEGGER, supra note 72, at 127–29.
81. HEIDEGGER, supra note 77, at 32.
82. HEIDEGGER, supra note 75, at 127.
83. HEIDEGGER, supra note 77, at 32.
84. Id. at 13.
85. Id. at 15–18.
86. Id at 14.

TRANTER K. Nomology, Ontology, and Phenomenology of Law and Technology. MINN. J.L. SCI.
& TECH. 2007;8(2):449-474.

464

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 8:2

commensurable. 87 There is a danger in this:
As soon as the unconcealed no longer concerns man even as object,
but does so, rather, exclusively as standing-reserve, and man in the
midst of the objectlessness is nothing but the orderer of the standingreserve, then he comes to the very brink of a precipitous fall; that is,
he comes to the point where he himself will have to be taken as
standing-reserve. 88

This loss in standing-reserve discloses an even greater
danger. “Where this ordering holds sway, it drives out every
other possibility of revealing, Above all, Enframing conceals
that revealing which . . . lets what presences come forth into
appearance.” 89 The challenging-forth of Enframing blocks
more original bringing-forth of things in-themselves. The
supreme danger then is that Enframing conceals the very
possibility of revealing, removing humanity from alētheia. 90
In summary, technology for Heidegger was not just
machines: it was a fundamental way to view the world, a way
of seeing that reduces the world to a mere stockpile of
resources waiting for human use. This extends to the way of
seeing humans themselves. The ultimate danger, however, is
that revealing the world is the fundamental task of Being.
Technology in occupying this place within modern existence
deprives us humans from seeing the ‘truth’ of the world.
Technology, thus properly understood and located means that
we live a polluted and corrupted form of existences that can
not see beyond the ceaseless calculus of technology.
There are two elements from Heidegger for thinking about
law and technology. The first exculpates law and technology
scholarship’s reduction of law to technology. Where “the
coming to presence of technology . . . is Being itself,” 91 an
instrumental law is consistent with the foundation ontology of
the “age.” 92 Indeed, Heidegger expects nothing more from
“research man.” 93 In this light, the technology of law in law
and technology is revealed, not as ironic, but as another sign of
the victory of technology. Developing this insight at the level
of theory, Heidegger offers an ontological location for the

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 19.
Id. at 26–27.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 28.
HEIDEGGER, supra note 76, at 38.
HEIDEGGER, supra note 75, at 115.
Id. at 125.
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nomology of sovereignty identified previously. Heidegger
provides an explanation for the juridical-political account of
the rise of sovereignty and positivism; both witness a
challenging-forth of law into a malleable standing-reserve
ready to be deployed. 94 He also charts the bloody “precipitous
fall” when orderer becomes ordered. In this, Heidegger’s
technology writings possibly allow for another approach to the
maligned task of an ontology—or at least a regional
ontology 95 —of law. 96
The second element is the delineation of the task of
thinking about law and technology once the holding sway of
technology is noted. Heidegger’s account of technology has had
a decisive influence on technology studies; Herbert Marcuse, 97
Jacques Ellul, 98 and more recently Albert Borgmann 99 and
Francis Fukuyama 100 have grounded their critiques of modern
technology on metaphysical foundations. There is a tragic
aura surrounding this tradition. 101 The absolute of technology,
its occupation of Being, and the decline of more authentic
Being, means that it is difficult to theorize strategies for
overcoming technology. 102 Heidegger’s response is poetic.
Indeed, there is a poetic resonance to his thought—truth as
revealing, being as responsibility to revealing—that crescendos
with his affirmation of the “saving power” of art. 103 For
Heidegger, meditation on the essence of technology does not
94. Nonet, supra note 62, at 686.
95. JARKKO TONTII, RIGHT AND PREJUDICE: PROLEGOMENA TO A
HERMENEUTICAL PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 82 (2004).
96. Minkkinen, supra note 68, at 84.
97. HERBERT MARCUSE, ONE-DIMENSIONAL MAN: STUDIES IN THE
IDEOLOGY OF ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY (1964); see also FEENBERG,
supra note 71.
98. JACQUES ELLUL, THE TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY (John Wilkinson
trans., 1964); see also ANDREW FEENBERG, QUESTIONING TECHNOLOGY 3
(1999).
99. ALBERT BORGMANN, HOLDING ON TO REALITY: THE NATURE OF
INFORMATION AT THE TURN OF THE MILLENNIUM (1999); see also Peter-Paul
Verbeek, Devices of Engagement: On Borgmann’s Philosophy of Information
and Technology, 6 TECHNE 69 (2002).
100. FRANCIS FUKIYAMA, OUR POSTHUMAN FUTURE: CONSEQUENCES OF
THE BIOTECHNOLOGY REVOLUTION (2002); see also David E. Tabachnick, The
Politics and Philosophy of Anti-Science, 9 TECHNE 27 (2005).
101. STEPHEN HILL, THE TRAGEDY OF TECHNOLOGY: HUMAN LIBERATION
VERSUS DOMINATION IN THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1988); see also
David E. Tabachnick, Techne, Technology, and Tragedy, 7 TECHNE 91 (2004).
102. Andrew Norris, Heideggerian Law Beyond Law?: Technique, Recht,
and Phusis, 2 LAW CULTURE & HUMAN. 341, 344 (2006).
103. HEIDEGGER, supra note 72, at 32.
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only show the dominance of technology in the West but
reminds us of technology’s ancient sibling. Referring again to
pre-Socratic Greece, he observed that once “there was a time
when the bringing-forth of the true into the beautiful was
called technē. And the poēisis of the fine arts also was called
technē.” 104 He suggested that “revealing lays claim to the arts
most primally, so that they for their part may expressly foster
the growth of the saving power, may awaken.” 105 Heidegger’s
affirmation of art as the place which has kept alive alternative
modes of revealing is contested. Indeed, Benjamin suggested
that in art the combination of art and technique is inseparable;
art anticipates technology, and the technicality of art demarks
“humanity’s entire mode of existence.” 106 Benjamin can be
seen as pointing towards an alternative direction from
Heidegger: a turning away from metaphysics, and also a
turning away from romantic attachments to an idealized past
of authentic being. In technology studies, this postHeideggerian strand can be identified in Donna Haraway. 107
Haraway expressly rejected metaphysical approaches to
thinking about technology. Her appropriation of science
fiction’s cyborg is without tragedy or romance. The cyborg is a
materialist account of what it means to be human at the
particular moment when technology has undermined the past
certainties of existence: 108 “[t]he cyborg is our ontology.” 109 In
this, Haraway seems to reiterate Heidegger’s declaration of
the occupation of Being by technology. However, instead of
talking of the saving power of art, Haraway affirms active
engagement with the contemporary “informatics of
domination.” 110 The issue is staking a life, and politics, from
“inside the belly of the monster” of modern technological
existence. 111 Rosi Braidotti, in recognizing the influences of
104. Id. at 34.
105. Id. at 35.
106. WALTER BENJAMIN, The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical
Reproduction, in ILLUMINATIONS 217, 222 (Hannah Arendt ed., 1968).
107. ROSI BRAIDOTTI, TRANSPOSITIONS: ON NOMADIC ETHICS 57 (2006).
108. DONNA
HARAWAY,
MODEST_WITNESS@SECOND_MILLENIUM.FEMALEMAN©_MEETS_ONCOMOUS
E™: FEMINISM AND TECHNOSCIENCE 51 (1997).
109. Donna J. Haraway, A Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology and
Socialist Feminism in the 1980s, 80 SOCIALIST REV. 65, 66 (1985).
110. Id. at 79.
111. Constance Penley & Andrew Ross, Cyborgs at Large: Interview with
Donna Haraway, 25 SOC. TEXT 8, 12 (1990).
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French post-structuralists Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze
in Haraway’s cyborg, has argued for the “embodied, materialist
foundations of the subject in a non-essentialist yet accountable
manner.” 112 In doing so she affirms that this approach takes
as its orientation Heidegger’s recognition that the horizon of
humanity rests in being thrown into the world, yet it avoids
his romance with art and metaphysics. 113 For Braidotti,
being-in the world must ground development of “new
cosmologies . . . that are appropriate to our own high level of
technological development.” 114 Braidotti’s talk of cosmologies
suggests a revisiting of law and technology scholarship. What
is suggested here is a challenge to the double inscription of the
Frankenstein myth within law and technology scholarship
that was identified earlier. Instead, of a monstrous technology
needing a monstrous law, both technology and law are
repositioned as thoroughly social, as being-in the world. In
this they present no-less danger to society or even human life,
however, their dangerous becomes a known quantity and the
complex relationships between law and technology are
exposed.
IV. PHENOMENOLOGY OF TECHNOLOGY
Haraway and Braidotti both approach the question of
technology and humanity from the ground of being-in the
world. In this they offer a phenomenology of technology. Their
concern is with charting the complex relations of culture,
nature, knowledge, and power of the here-and-now, as the
basis for political engagement and ethical conduct. My
argument is that the phenomenology of technology has the
potential to enrich law and technology. Two approaches for a
phenomenology of law and technology are explored. The first
follows Haraway and Latour and examines the relationships of
law, technology and society from within a detailed historical
frame. The second draws upon science fiction to consider the
cultural basis of the speculative jurisdiction of law and
technology.
The first draws upon Haraway’s desire that “[a]ny
interesting being in technoscience, such as a textbook,
molecule, equation . . . can – and often should – be teased open
to show the sticky economic, technical, political, organic,
112. BRAIDOTTI, supra note 107, at 137.
113. Id. at 142.
114. Id. at 272.
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historical, mythic and textual threads that make up its
tissues.” 115 Notwithstanding her disagreement with Latour, 116
this task seems analogous to Latour’s actor network theory.
Latour’s early research considered how scientific facts do not
arrive from the black box of the laboratory but emerges
through a process of translation and alliances between
scientists and other actors. While Latour considers actors
from within a scientist’s research community and political,
media, and economic actors, his insight is that machines and
objects also should be treated as actors within his sociology of
networks. 117 In Aramis or The Love of Technology, Latour
traces how mundane and often haphazard political, economic,
social, and technical factors, and the personalities of agents,
including the personality of the technology itself, interacted
over an eighteen year period, and led to the abandonment of
an alternative public transport system for Paris. 118
This body of research suggests an approach to law and
technology that undertakes detailed examinations of the
networks at play behind not just technological change, but also
legal responses to technological change. Templates for this
type of study can be found in the detailed historical studies on
the relations between culture and technology, for example
Wolfgang Schivelbusch’s complex study of railways in the
nineteenth century. 119 There has been some research that
undertakes this type of historical analysis to law and
technology. Brad Sherman and Lionel Bently trace the
multitude of factors that impacted the changes and emergence
of British intellectual property law, noting the variations in
alliances of representations, interests groups and general
conceptions of good government during their extended time
period (1760-1911). 120 I have tried to show how an early
Australian motor vehicle law can be understood, not as a
simplistic reaction to the motor vehicle, but a complex

115. HARAWAY, supra note 108, at 68.
116. Id. at 34.
117. BRUNO LATOUR, SCIENCE IN ACTION: HOW TO FOLLOW SCIENTISTS
AND ENGINEERS THROUGH SOCIETY (1987).
118. BRUNO LATOUR, ARAMIS OR THE LOVE OF TECHNOLOGY (Catherine
Porter trans., 1996).
119. WOLFGANG SCHIVELBUSCH, THE RAILWAY JOURNEY: THE
INDUSTRIALIZATION OF TIME AND SPACE IN THE 19TH CENTURY (1986).
120. BRAD SHERMAN & LIONEL BENTLY, THE MAKING OF MODERN
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE 1760–1911 (1999).
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interchange of public anxiety, the personality of specific
politicians, use of English templates, lobbying by the nascent
motoring club, and a manifestation of a public culture that
celebrated technology as progress, dreamed of mass
automotive transportation and regarded regulative legislation
as the best, most modern form of governing. 121
This type of research maps the complexities of culture and
personalities, and the more “abstract” political, economic, and
legal contexts. It shows how law and technology are not only
joined at the site of law regulating a technology, but also have
multiple intersections. It can also contribute to technology
studies. Notwithstanding Latour’s passing reference to law as
a “modest technology,” 122 law has not been considered within
existing research. Indeed, when Latour writes about the red
light flashing in his motor vehicle insisting that he fasten his
seat belt, 123 it is a machine animated by ninety years of legal
argument concerning who carries the liability for motor vehicle
safety, the state, the manufacturer or the driver. Also, this
form of scholarship, in building an archive of how actual laws,
or even actual non-laws (movements towards law that were
scuttled), can provide a basis for law and technology scholars
to contribute to the task of advising about law and technology.
Instead of passing responsibility to another black box—the
political will—as Reynolds does, a more sophisticated
generalization can be developed on how law and technology
interact.
An alternative to this historical direction of a
phenomenology of law and technology is to look at the
everyday goings on of law and technology. This can be seen to
follow the anthropological work of Marilyn Strathern who
undertook an ethnographic study of in vitro fertilization (IVF)

121. Kieran Tranter, The History of the Haste-Wagons’: The Motor Car Act
1909 (VIC), Emergent Technology and the Call for Law, 29 MELB. U. L. REV.
843 (2005).
122. LATOUR, supra note 118, at 45. Latour has recently written about the
courtroom from his perspective of the production of “facts” in a laboratory.
However, the traces of law on technology have not been thoroughly pursued.
See Bruno Latour, Scientific Objects and Legal Objectivity, in LAW,
ANTHROPOLOGY, AND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SOCIAL: MAKING PERSONS
AND THINGS 73 (Alain Pottage & Martha Mundy eds., 2004).
123. Bruno Latour, Where Are the Missing Masses? The Sociology of a Few
Mundane Artifacts, in SHAPING TECHNOLOGY / BUILDING SOCIETY: STUDIES
IN SOCIOTECHNICAL CHANGE 225, 226 (Wiebe E. Bijker & John Law eds.,
1992).

TRANTER K. Nomology, Ontology, and Phenomenology of Law and Technology. MINN. J.L. SCI.
& TECH. 2007;8(2):449-474.

470

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 8:2

technologies to identify Western notions of kinship. 124 Her
research is reminiscent of Shoshana Zuboff’s description of
double security doors at a mill that were phased so that only
one could be open at any time: which broke because staff
consistently pushed their way through. 125 At the level of
being-in the world in the daily life of the contemporary West
rarely does technology impose itself as Heidegger’s Enframing,
and rarely does law impose itself as abstract rules. Technology
and law are part of the background of the activities of daily
life, something Langdon Winner reminds about technology. 126
Mundane tasks such as driving a motor vehicle down a street
involve a kaleidoscope of legal and technical considerations
and interrelations. A human driving invokes legal regimes of
licensing, criminal laws relating to motor vehicles, of torts and
insurance law (concerning liability) and of contract, consumer
protection and property (concerning ownership) and reliance
on the multiple technical apparatus of the motor vehicle,
which in-turn are influenced by laws relating to, for example
safety and fuel consumption. Given these complexities of
human, law and technology no wonder human car relations
have been argued to be cybernetic. 127 However, in the task of
driving, the driver remains ignorant of these and their
multiple interactions. Drawing upon Latour’s later work it can
be said that technological objects and humans jointly form a
culture which structures particular forms of relationships
(between objects and objects, objects and humans, humans and
humans) and within which some relationships possess
particular characteristics that allow them to be regarded as
In this manifestation, a
profane, ethical, or legal. 128
phenomenology of law and technology examines the contours
of contemporary culture locating the relations of law and
technology in the realm of practice. Implicit in this approach
is the realization that in the messy complexities of everyday

124. MARILYN STRATHERN, AFTER NATURE: ENGLISH KINSHIP IN THE LATE
TWENTIETH CENTURY (1992).
125. SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, IN THE AGE OF THE SMART MACHINE: THE
FUTURE OF WORK AND POWER 21 (1988).
126. LANGDON WINNER, THE WHALE AND THE REACTOR: A SEARCH FOR
LIMITS IN AN AGE OF HIGH TECHNOLOGY 7–9 (1986).
127. Kieran Tranter, Mad Max: The Car and Australian Government, 5
NATIONAL IDENTITIES 61 (2003).
128. Bruno Latour, Morality and Technology: The End of the Means, 19
THEORY, CULTURE AND SOC’Y 247 (2002).
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life in the West there is a more sophisticated “theorizing” of
technology than the post-Heidegger metaphysical strand
within technology studies recognizes. 129 Notwithstanding, as
was identified earlier, this tradition’s tendency to announce
technology as holding sway over Being and, therefore, the
difficulties, if not the inescapable tragedy of technology for the
West, contemporary culture seems to provide sufficient
resources for many Westerners to live within a highly
technological society and to adapt to technological changes. 130
Within technology studies, this respect for contemporary
culture is recognized in the links it forges with science fiction
studies. Haraway’s adoption of the cyborg is a key moment in
the cross-fertilization of these two disciplines. 131 In law, the
field of law and literature is increasingly moving away from its
canonical texts and orthodox concerns with courtrooms and
images of lawyers 132 through analyzing the “culture of
legality” recorded in popular texts. 133 An emerging element of
this movement has been the discovery of science fiction by
legal scholars, 134 and a realization that science fiction
contributes to popular jurisprudence. 135 What remains to be
explored is science fiction as a discourse on the theory of law
and technology.
As identified in the circulation of the Frankenstein myth

129. FREDRIC JAMESON, POSTMODERNISM, OR, THE CULTURAL LOGIC OF
LATE CAPITALISM 376 (1991).
130. As recently suggested by Turkle in recognition of the adoption of
computers. Sherry Turkle, Our Split Screens, in COMMUNITY IN THE DIGITAL
AGE 101 (Andrew Feenberg & Darin Barney eds., 2004).
131. Istvan Csicsery-Ronay, Jr., The Cyborg and the Kitchen Sink; or The
Salvation Story of No Salvation Story, 25 SCI.-FICTION STUD. 510 (1998).
132. Austin Sarat et al., On Film and Law: Broadening the Focus, in LAW
ON THE SCREEN 1 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2005).
133. WILLIAM P. MACNEIL, LEX POPULI: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF POPULAR
CULTURE (2007).
134. See, e.g., Christine Corcos, Isabel Corcos & Brian Stockhoff, DoubleTake: A Second Look at Cloning, Science Fiction and Law, 59 LA. L. REV.
1041 (1999); Christine Corcos, “I Am Not a Number I Am a Free Man!”:
Physical and Psychological Imprisonment in Science Fiction, 25 LEGAL STUD.
F. 472 (2001); Paul Joseph & Sharon Carton, The Law of the Federation:
Images of Law, Lawyers and the Legal System in “Star Trek: The Next
Generation”, 24 U. TOL. L. REV. 43 (1992); Jeffery Nesteruk, A New Narrative
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within law and technology scholarship, metaphors with
fictitious origins structure legal accounts of technology.
Further, law and technology scholarship, as was shown in
Reynolds, gestures towards the future when it imagines the
impacts of the specific technology under the legal
microscope. 136 This is a fundamental element of law and
technology writing.
There is a claim about “what if”
technology develops in a certain way, and then evidence that
such speculations are not groundless.
In this law and
technology claims for itself a speculative jurisdiction; that is it
makes what seems at the time reasonable and justifiable
claims about the future. History can later judge on the
oracular quality of past exercises of the speculative
jurisdiction. 137 It is science fiction that is a privileged resource
in this future projecting by law of the consequences of
technological change. For example I have argued elsewhere
that the form and content of international space law of the
1960s and 1970s responded to imaginations and anxieties of
technological future present in 1950s “Golden Age” science
fiction such as Isaac Asimov and Fredrick Pohl and C. M.
Kornbluth. 138 The opportunity for law and technology is that it
could make this process explicit. Further, through
systematically approaching science fiction as material through
which being-in the world with technology can be glimpsed, not
only would law and technology be reflecting on its own
discursive practices, but might be able to challenge and
substitute its foundational Frankenstein myth with a wider
repertoire of metaphors and narratives through which to think
about law and technology. 139
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international space lawyers during the “golden age” of space law.
138. Kieran Tranter Terror in the Texts: Law – Technology – Future 13
LAW & CRITIQUE 75 (2002)
139. A task I have begun. See Kieran Tranter, “Frakking Toasters” and
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CONCLUSION
Thinking about the theory of law and technology yields a
series of recognitions. There is recognition that much law and
technology scholarship is structured by a particular
manifestation of the Frankenstein myth that ironically casts
law as technology. In this it is possible to say that law and
technology already present a theoretical account of law and
technology. In regarding law as technology, what is disclosed is
the nomology of sovereignty, which legal theory has charted as
involving law as malleable rules emanating from a sovereign
that, in the extreme moment, can violently reduce humans to
animals to be used and sacrificed at will. In technology
studies, this juridical-political account is placed within the
ontological realm through Heidegger’s argument that modern
Being has been given over to a mode of disclosing that involves
the ordering of the world as standing reserve. It was
suggested that there are two post-Heideggerian strands with
technology studies. The first, tracking Heidegger closely, is the
metaphysical account of technology. This leads to glum
destinations of absolute technology and enslaved humanity.
The second lies in appreciation of being-in the world, or a
Haraway and Braidotti inspired phenomenology of technology.
Two directions were offered for the phenomenology of law and
technology. The first, drawing upon Latour, was a historical
project of mapping the complexities of law and technology
through detailed study of the networks that manifest in
particular technologies and particular moments of lawmaking.
The second was to appreciate the sophistication of
contemporary culture in allowing a highly dynamic
technological life through recognition of the current
significance of science fiction to law and technology’s
speculative jurisdiction and to analysis science fiction, not only
rendering this process transparent, but as a way of
supplanting the foundational Frankenstein myth with
additional metaphors and narratives.
In conclusion, this Article argues for a diverse law and
technology scholarship. In particular, it suggests that
contemporary law and technology scholarship grounded on the
Frankenstein myth of reducing law to technology, fails to
capture the diversity and complexities of law’s and
technology’s interactions. Through considering law as
technology from the perspective of legal theory and technology
studies it was argued that a hybrid approach, drawing upon
insights from both disciplines, suggests that phenomenological
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studies, that is a focus on being-in the world, offers a way
forward for the law and technology. To this end detailed
historical analysis of networks or the systemic analysis of
science fiction was presented as alternative methods through
which to study law and technology.

